Figure 1. Demand for Shoes



Notes: 95% Confidence Intervals in parentheses.

Figure 2: Experimental Treatments

Panel A. Information



Panel B. Parental Gender



Panel C. Liquidity



Notes: The confidence intervals reported are of the difference between the given experimental groups. All figures are Intent-to-Treat estimates.

Figure 3. Results from Smaller-Scale Projects in Guatemala, Uganda, and India

Panel A. Guatemala



Panel B. Uganda



Panel C. India



Notes: The confidence intervals reported are of the difference between the given experimental groups.

Table 1. Randomization Check

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		Coefficients of OLS Regression of Given Treatment on Dependent Variable			p-value for test of joint significance of
	Overall Mean	Script	Male Sampled for Interview	Experimental Payout	All price dummies
Panel A. Household Level Variables					
Dual-Headed Household	0.81	0.00	-0.03	-0.09	0.16
	(0.39)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	
Number of Children	3.52	-0.03	-0.03	0.20	0.87
	(1.74)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.26)	
Average child health (1-5 scale)[1]	2.53	0.03	-0.05	0.07	0.97
	(0.60)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	
Percentage of children with	0.23	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.63
worms in past year	(0.19)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	
Proportion of Children	0.17	-0.01	0.02	-0.06	0.25
owning shoes	(0.19)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)**	
Percentage of children	0.13	0.04	0.02	-0.12	0.44
at interview wearing shoes	(0.44)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	
Proportion of Children who do	0.92	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.97
not always use latrine/bathroom	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	
Value of Animals Owned	10.75	0.40	0.25	1.01	0.16
(in 1,000 Ksh)	(12.26)	(0.83)	(0.83)	(1.94)	
Panel B. Individual Level Variables					
Gender (1=male)	0.28	-0.04	-	0.07	0.42
	(0.45)	(0.02)	-	(0.06)	
Years Education	5.60	-0.07	-	-0.31	0.74
	(3.80)	(0.24)	-	(0.57)	
Literate (Swahili)	0.67	0.00	-	-0.03	0.77
	(0.47)	(0.03)	-	(0.07)	
Age	39.34	-0.61	-	3.45	0.43
	(14.57)	(0.93)	-	(2.18)	
Occupation = farmer	0.54	-0.01	-	-0.07	0.53
	(0.50)	(0.03)	-	(0.08)	
Self-reported health status	2.43	0.01	-	0.22	1.00
(1-5 scale)	(0.70)	(0.04)	-	(0.11)**	
Percentage of adults	0.34	-0.02	-	0.03	0.47
at interview wearing shoes[2]	(0.46)	(0.03)	-	(0.07)	
Had worms in past year	0.26	-0.02	-	0.00	0.40
	(0.44)	(0.03)	-	(0.08)	
Amount invested (out of 100 Ksh)	52.47	1.77	-	-	0.41
in risky asset	(20.71)	(1.34)	-	-	
Somewhat Patient	0.08	0.00	-	-	0.62
	(0.27)	(0.02)	-	-	
Number of Observations	999				

Notes: In Column 1, the overall sample mean is reported (with the standard deviation in parentheses). Columns 2-5 report results from a regression of the given dependent variable on price dummies, an indicator for whether the household was sampled for the script, an indicator for whether the male was sampled to participate, and the experimental cash payout. Columns 2-4 report coefficients (standard errors in parentheses), while Column 5 report the p-values for the test of joint insignificance of all the price dummies. The table is broken into panels for household and individual level variables because individuals means would be expected to differ between men and women. The coefficient on the experimental payout is not included in the regressions for time/risk preferences as the payment is not orthogonal to those (and they are included in controls in all regressions - see text). See text for definitions of risk/time variables.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

[1]One is "very good" and 5 is "very poor."

[2]This variable is listed as an individual level variable since men are more likely to wear shoes than women.

Table 2. Experimental Treatments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Dependent Variable = 1 if Purchased Shoes				
Price = 5 Ksh	0.93	0.98	1.09	1.09	1.05
	(0.03)***	(0.09)***	(0.42)***	(0.42)***	(0.42)**
Price = 15 Ksh	0.88	0.94	1.05	1.05	1.01
	(0.03)***	(0.09)***	(0.42)**	(0.42)**	(0.42)**
Price = 25 Ksh	0.85	0.91	1.00	1.01	0.97
	(0.03)***	(0.09)***	(0.42)**	(0.42)**	(0.42)**
Price = 35 Ksh	0.77	0.84	0.93	0.93	0.88
	(0.03)***	(0.09)***	(0.42)**	(0.42)**	(0.42)**
Price = 55 Ksh	0.51	0.59	0.68	0.68	0.64
	(0.03)***	(0.09)***	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Price = 65 Ksh	0.42	0.49	0.58	0.58	0.54
	(0.03)***	(0.09)***	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Received Script			-0.02	-0.06	-0.06
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Experimental Payout (in 100 Ksh)			0.22	0.16	0.17
			(0.06)***	(0.08)**	(0.08)**
Male Received Treatments			-0.05	-0.05	
(Double Headed Household only)[1]			(0.03)*	(0.03)*	
Male Actually Received Script					-0.09
(Double Headed Household only)[2]					(0.05)*
Received Script * Experimental Payout				0.13	0.12
				(0.12)	(0.12)
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV
Cluster Dummies	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	999	999	999	999	999
R-squared	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.80	-

Notes: Experimental payout is in 100 Ksh. Exchange rate roughly 75 Ksh to US $1 during this time period. Some values of the experimental payout and gender of the respondent were missing. To avoid dropping these, we code them as 0 and include dummies for having a missing value (so that the coefficients are relevant only for those with non-missing values). Clusters were calculated from GPS coordinates and sampling was stratified at that level. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

[1]Regressions in Columns 3 and 4 include a dummy for whether the household was double headed, and an interaction between not being double headed and being sampled for the male treatment. This is because the gender of the respondent can only be random for dual headed households, so this coefficient should be interpreted as the difference in male and female purchases for dual headed households.

[2]Variable is instrumented with whether the male was sampled for the interview. See Appendix Table A1 for the first stage regression

Table 3. Worm Knowledge

	(1)	(2)
Panel A. Immediately after getting script		
Read Script	0.34	0.34
	(0.01)***	(0.01)***
Extended Controls	N	Y
Observations	989	989
R-squared	0.54	0.91
Mean in Control Group	0.29	0.29
Panel B. Three to Four Months Later		
Read Script	0.24	0.24
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***
Extended Controls	N	Y
Observations	377	377
R-squared	0.40	0.92
Mean in Control Group	0.37	0.37

Regressions in Column 2 control for all experimental treatments and the risk/time preferences. Some values of the experimental payout and gender of the respondent were missing. To avoid dropping these, we code them as 0 and include dummies for having a missing value (so that the coefficients are relevant only for those with non-missing values).
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4. Testing for Spillover Effects in Redemption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent Variable: Redeemed Coupon					
Panel A. Geographical Neighbors						
Within 300m of household						
# of Neighbors	0.001	0.001				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
% of Neighbors getting price less than 35 Ksh	0.073					
	(0.080)					
% of Neighbors getting script		0.057				
		(0.117)				
Within 500m of household						
# of Neighbors			0.000	0.000		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
% of Neighbors getting price less than 35 Ksh			0.020			
			(0.109)			
% of Neighbors getting script				0.295		
				(0.209)		
Within 1,000m of household						
# of Neighbors					0.000	0.000
					(0.001)	(0.001)
% of Neighbors getting price less than 35 Ksh					0.037	
					(0.150)	
% of Neighbors getting script						0.058
						(0.657)
Observations	997	997	998	998	999	999
Panel B. Health Contacts						
# of Contacts in experiment	0.022	0.022				
	(0.017)	(0.017)				
% of Contacts getting price less than 35 Ksh	-0.015					
	(0.039)					
% of Contacts getting script		-0.07				
		(0.0375)*				
Observations	868	868				

Notes: regressions control for all experimental treatments and include geographical (cluster) controls. Standard errors are clustered at that level. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5. Mechanisms

	(1)	(2)
Panel A. Imitative Peer Effects		
Were slipper popular among children?	0.926	353
Did your child ask you to buy slippers?	0.689	376
Did your child want them more because other children had them?	0.753	376
Did you want them more because other children had them?	0.705	376
Would you feel poorer if the neighbor's children had slippers but yours didn't?	0.699	376
Would your neighbor buying a TV make you want to buy one more?	0.532	376
Would you feel poorer if the neighbors had TV and you didn't?	0.629	377
Panel B. Social Interactions		
Did you talk to anybody else who had received a voucher?	0.799	378
Did neighbors know what price coupon you got?	0.789	360
If received script: did you talk to others about worms?	0.725	182
If didn't receive script: did anybody talk to you about worms?	0.517	178
Panel C. Reasons for Purchasing		
Would other parents think you were a bad parent if you didn't redeem at low price?	0.779	348
Would other parents think you were a bad parent if you didn't redeem at high price?	0.503	342
For those who redeemed, what is the main reason you redeemed?		
Price was low	0.416	279
Pressure from children	0.108	279
Neighbors	0.075	279
Health	0.330	279
Other	0.072	279

Notes: Means presented from follow-up interview at conclusion of project.

Table 6. External Validity: Pilot Experiments in Guatemala, India, and Uganda

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent Variable = 1 if Purchased Product					
	Guatemala		Uganda		India	
	Soap	Vitamins	Soap	Vitamins	Soap	Vitamins
Price = 25% Retail	0.82	0.80	1.00	0.93	0.85	0.73
	(0.08)***	(0.07)***	(0.03)***	(0.05)***	(0.04)***	(0.06)***
Price = 50% Retail	0.73	0.78	0.96	0.83	0.78	0.73
	(0.07)***	(0.07)***	(0.03)***	(0.04)***	(0.05)***	(0.06)***
Price = 75% Retail	0.55	0.59	0.91	0.58	0.69	0.56
	(0.07)***	(0.07)***	(0.03)***	(0.05)***	(0.05)***	(0.07)***
Invited to Health Seminar	-0.04	0.01	-0.03	0.01		
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)		
Read Script					0.14	0.05
					(0.05)***	(0.06)
Observations	174	175	233	281	234	221
R-squared	0.69	0.74	0.95	0.82	0.85	0.72

Notes: All respondents were women. Regressions include all the controls listed in Table A3. Standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 7. Comparative Results of Some Recent Experimental Health Studies

Study	Country	Product	Price Sensitivity[1]	Information Effects	Peer Network Effects	Gender Effects
Current Studies	Kenya	Shoes (Rubber shoes)	e_s = -0.405	No effect of script	No friendship or geographical effects	Positive for mothers
	Guatemala	Hand soap and Vitamins	e_s = -0.776 e_v = -0.547	No effect from health seminar	NA	NA
	India	Hand soap and Vitamins	e_s = -0.345 e_v = -0.407	Significant effect of script for 1 product	NA	NA
	Uganda	Hand soap and Vitamins	e = -0.156 e_v = -0.883	No effect from health seminar	NA	NA
Kremer and Miguel (2007)	Kenya	Deworming Treatment[2]	Very high at p = 0.[3]	Education campaign (among children) had no effect	Negative peer effects on treatment uptake	NA
Ashraf, Berry, & Shapiro (2010)	Zambia	Chlorine water purification	e = -0.60 [4]	NA	NA	Only Women
Cohen and Dupas (2010), Dupas (2009, 2010)	Kenya	Treated bed nets	e = -0.47 (Cohen and Dupas 2010)	No significant effect of scripts[5]	Strong peer effects[6]	No effect
Oster and Thornton (2010)	Nepal	Menstrual Cups	NA	NA	Strong peer effects	Only Women
Kremer et al. (2011)	Kenya	Chlorine water purification	Very high at p=0.[7]	Small effects from inform. campaign	Little evidence of peer effects	Only Women
Ashraf, Jack, & Kamenica (2011)	Zambia	Chlorine water purification	e = -0.636.[8]	No level effect, but increases price elasticity.	NA	NA

[1]Column reports elasticities at mean price unless otherwise noted.

[2]Albendazole and praziquantel.

[3]Relative to a zero price, a $0.30 fee cost-recovery fee decreased demand 80%.

[4]About 80 percent of respondents bought Clorin at 300 Kw with 50 percent buying at 800 Kw (3200 Kw = $1US).

[5]Neither health nor financial encouragements significantly affected purchase.

[6]Households who were surrounded by other households receiving a low price in a first phase (who were much more likely to purchase bed nets) were more likely to purchase them in the second phase.

[7]Usage falls from 58% to 3.5% when price increases from zero to 20 Kenyan shillings and take-up is low at all positive prices.

[8]Taken at means of price and take-up. When provided consumer information, magnitude of elasticity increases to -0.876.

Appendix Table A1. Background Characteristics of those Selected for Follow-up

	(1) Administered Follow-up Survey
Price = 5 Ksh	0.04
	(0.05)
Price = 15 Ksh	0.04
	(0.05)
Price = 25 Ksh	0.07
	(0.05)
Price = 35 Ksh	0.09
	(0.05)*
Price = 55 Ksh	0.00
	(0.05)
Sampled for Script	-0.03
	(0.03)
Male	-0.07
	(0.03)**
Risk Payout	-0.06
	(0.07)
p-value for joint test of all treatments	0.20
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.38
Number of Observations	999
R-squared	0.01

Notes: Omitted price category is 65 Ksh.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix Table A2. First Stage for Randomization of Gender of Household Head

	(1) Male Interviewed
Male Sampled for Interview	0.57
	(0.03)***
Constant	0.04
	(0.02)**
Number of Observations	812
R-squared	0.37

Notes: No controls are included. Regressions is restricted to dual-headed households.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix Table A3. Randomization Check for Pilots in Guatemala, Uganda, and India

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
		Coefficients of OLS Regression of Treatment Indicators on Dependent Variable					p-value for test of joint significance of all price dummies
	Overall Mean	50% Retail	75% Retail	Invited to Seminar	Read Script	Product = Soap	
Panel A. Guatemala							
Years Education	1.94	-0.55	-0.27	-0.36		-0.02	0.19
	(2.31)	(0.31)*	(0.31)	(0.25)		(0.25)	
Age	37.53	2.46	0.61	-3.39		-0.21	0.33
	(13.25)	(1.75)	(1.80)	(1.43)**		(1.41)	
Number of Children	3.48	-0.06	0.34	0.05		-0.14	0.39
	(2.38)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.26)		(0.26)	
Household has Access to Piped Water	0.89	0.04	0.06	-0.04		0.01	0.30
	(0.31)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.03)	
Number of Observations	349						
Panel B. Uganda							
Years Education	5.70	-0.88	-0.30	0.10		-0.75	0.09*
	(3.98)	(0.40)**	(0.46)	(0.35)		(0.36)**	
Age	32.87	1.50	-0.23	0.53		0.71	0.17
	(9.31)	(0.95)	(1.07)	(0.83)		(0.84)	
Number of Children	4.17	-0.07	-0.30	-0.07		0.22	0.32
	(1.77)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.16)		(0.16)	
Household has Access to Piped Water	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.01		0.08	0.75
	(0.22)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.02)***	
Number of Observations	514						
Panel C. India							
Years Education	5.50	0.74	-0.46		-1.46	-0.10	0.07*
	(4.44)	(0.50)	(0.50)		(0.41)***	(0.41)	
Age	39.38	-0.52	1.14		-1.06	0.68	0.36
	(9.82)	(1.11)	(1.12)		(0.93)	(0.93)	
Number of Children	1.25	0.03	0.01		0.03	-0.04	0.97
	(1.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.10)	
Household has Access to Piped Water	0.42	0.04	0.07		0.06	-0.04	0.49
	(0.49)	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)	
Number of Observations	455						

Notes: Each row is a separate regression of the given dependent variable on all the treatments listed. The omitted price category is 25% of the retail price, and the omitted health product is adult multivitamins. All respondents were women. Standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%